AhlulBayt News Agency: The battle over renewing the sanctions regime on Yemen inside the UN Security Council unfolded amid a highly complex international moment shaped by three intersecting dynamics: the repercussions of the war in Gaza and the Red Sea and the Yemeni operations targeting navigation linked to the Zionist occuapation; the accelerating strategic tension between the West and Russia–China in 2025, which turned most Security Council files into arenas of contestation between the two axes; and the stagnation of Yemen’s peace track, prompting Western powers to attempt reshaping the rules of engagement through the gateway of sanctions after the failure of the aggressive military operations against Yemen 2023-2025.
Within this context, both the United Kingdom and the United States pushed for the most significant amendment to the Yemen sanctions regime since 2015. Their approach—supported by Western political research centers, experts, and military advisers—sought to engineer a new security and legal-international environment in the Red Sea and Al Hudaydah, aiming to curb the growing military strength of the Yemeni Armed Forces – Sana'a.
However, this effort encountered the strongest joint Russian–Chinese objection in years on the Yemen file, ending with the draft’s collapse and forcing the Council to settle for a purely “technical renewal” of the old sanctions format, which Western powers describe as symbolic and ineffective.
Evolution of Yemen’s Sanctions Regime (2014–2025)
The current sanctions system arose from Resolution 2140 in February 2014, which established the Security Council’s foundational framework for intervention in Yemen under the pretext of “protecting the political process.”
The resolution imposed asset freezes and travel bans on individuals labeled as “obstructing the transitional process,” and created both the "Sanctions Committee" and the "Expert Team" as the technical bodies responsible for oversight, assessments, and recommendations.
In April 2015, Resolution 2216 marked a major turning point: it expanded sanctions from individuals to “entities,” imposing a comprehensive arms embargo on Ansar Allah, classifying them as a party that “threatens security and stability,” and granting Member States broad authority to inspect vessels bound for Yemen. This made the resolution the most consequential UN legal framework influencing the war and blockade throughout the decade of the aggressive war on Yemen.
Yet subsequent developments revealed that the sanctions regime failed to achieve its declared objectives. This was reflected clearly in the "Expert Team" report issued on 15 October 2025, covering the period between August 2024 and July 2025. The report claimed the arms embargo was “completely ineffective” and that Ansar Allah had built complex networks to circumvent restrictions. It also stated that asset freezes had a limited impact and lacked a deterrent effect.
The report’s assessments were not technical; they were drafted in a biased manner serving Western–Zionist–Gulf interests. Aligned with U.S.–U.K.–Zionist–Saudi–UAE–French orientations, the report recommended, for the first time since 2015, expanding inspections into the high seas—similar to the European “IRINI” model in Libya. This report later became the central justification used by the UK and the U.S. to claim that expanding the Yemen sanctions regime was necessary to “correct” the failure of previous resolutions.
From Escalation Attempt to Forced Retreat
The sanctions-renewal battle began early on 6 November, when the United Kingdom — the Security Council’s designated ‘penholder’ on Yemen — submitted its most extensive and significant draft since 2015.
The draft sought to completely restructure the sanctions regime, going beyond routine renewal to introduce a new package of binding restrictions. A core provision proposed, for the first time, a direct international ban on supplying dual-use components to Sana'a. The broad wording could have allowed tightening the blockade on civilian-use raw materials essential for industry, roads, and agriculture, under the claim that such materials could be used to manufacture “drones and missiles.”
The UK also sought an explicit international mandate allowing Member States, individually or in naval coalitions, to conduct maritime inspections in Yemeni waters and the high seas all the way to the Arabian Gulf. This would effectively place the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab under expanded international oversight outside the UNVIM mechanism in Djibouti, turning access of any vessel to Yemen into a matter dictated by the Western naval coalition—granting it the ability to delay shipments, deepen the blockade, and create internal pressure against the national authority in Sana'a.
Additionally, the draft sought to expand the classification of Ansar Allah, in other words, the Government in Sana'a, within a network of “transnational terrorist threats.” This would effectively universalize the unilateral U.S. “terrorism” designation by linking Ansar Allah and the national authorities in Sana'a to Somalia’s Al-Shabaab and armed groups in Sudan, while accusing Somalia of serving as an “arms transit hub” to Yemen.
The draft further included broad condemnations related to the “59 UN staff members detained” and, for the first time, introduced a tri-lateral coordination mechanism between the Yemen, Sudan, and Al-Shabaab sanctions committees—placing Yemen at the center of a complex cross-border security network. The entire draft clearly aimed to establish a parallel sanctions system to Resolution 2216, expanding Western pressure across maritime, territorial, financial, and logistical dimensions.
International Positions
The British–American draft triggered sharp divisions within the Security Council, reflecting the geopolitical climate.
The United States acted as a “co-engineer” of the draft, insisting on imposing financial sanctions on Ansar Allah as an entity—effectively targeting the Government in Sana'a and state institutions—equating the movement with global terrorist organizations subject to asset freezes and worldwide financial restrictions. Washington also strongly backed a maritime mechanism modeled on Operation IRINI, and pushed to include accusations that China supplied drone components to Sana'a—a move reflecting geopolitical rivalry with Beijing more than an objective assessment of the Yemen file.
The UK drafted a text mirroring the "Expert Team"’s recommendations—recommendations that were themselves biased and non-technical—aiming to redesign maritime inspections and expand sanctions to cover all economic activity in Sana'a.
France supported the draft but criticized it as “not ambitious enough,” calling for even stricter maritime measures.
Russia emerged as the primary obstacle to the escalation plan, describing the draft as “imbalanced and politicized,” and warning that it amounted to an attempt to impose Western maritime tutelage over the Red Sea, jeopardizing political settlement efforts.
China, for its part, rejected the dual-use component allegations, calling the U.S. claims “baseless.” Beijing warned that granting such a maritime mandate would violate the exclusive jurisdiction of the “flag State,” undermine freedom of navigation, and open the door to military interference under misleading “legal” cover.
Breaking Silence and Overturning the Draft (12–13 November)
After revisions, the UK placed the updated draft “under silence”—a procedural move intended to fast-track adoption and block further negotiations. But China and Russia broke the silence in a rare move, signaling categorical rejection.
Their objections centered on the draft’s continued references to “maritime interception operations,” dual-use components, and language undermining “flag State” authority while targeting Sana'a exclusively.
Realizing the draft would not pass and that a veto was imminent, the UK and the U.S. were forced to abandon the proposal entirely and shift to a plain “technical renewal,” avoiding an open confrontation in the Council.
What Was Removed from the Draft
Russian–Chinese pressure eliminated all core elements of the escalation project:
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Complete removal of the proposed international maritime inspection mechanism
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Deletion of all references to dual-use component sanctions
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Removal of links between Ansar Allah and Al-Shabaab
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Elimination of the tri-lateral sanctions committee coordination mechanism
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Withdrawal of the U.S. proposal to classify Ansar Allah as an entity subject to a global asset freeze
In effect, the British–American project collapsed, reduced to a minimal version containing only uncontroversial elements.
What Remained in the Final Resolution (Resolution 2801 – 14 November 2025)
The compromise produced a narrowly scoped decision that:
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Renews Resolution 2140 sanctions until November 2026
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Extends the "Expert Team"'s mandate to December 2026
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Assigns the team two technical reports on dual-use components and maritime information-sharing
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Includes condemnation of the “Detention of UN staff”
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Leaves Resolution 2216 unchanged, with no expansion
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Maintains the Djibouti-based UNVIM mechanism without authorizing any new maritime mandate
Why Washington and London Failed
The failure of the escalation project can be understood through four interlinked analytical layers:
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Geopolitical:
Russia and China oppose any mandate that expands U.S. military reach in the Red Sea—an area crucial to global navigation and China’s maritime routes. -
Legal:
The proposed maritime mandate violates international law, particularly UNCLOS and flag-state jurisdiction, creating a dangerous precedent. -
Political:
The attempt to equate Ansar Allah with “terrorism” lacks international consensus, and blaming Sana'a alone for maritime disruptions ignores the role of the Zionist entity and the blockade on Gaza. -
Operational and Logistical:
Replicating the IRINI model in the tense Red Sea environment risks military confrontations between Yemeni forces and regional or international powers.
Implications for Yemen and the Region
The collapse of the British–American draft represents a strategic gain for Sana'a, preventing harsher naval blockade measures, shielding Hodeidah ports from new forms of international intervention, and strengthening Sana'a’s political standing as an actor capable of resisting international pressure.
In the Red Sea, the decision preserves the existing legal framework, blocks attempts to legitimize new maritime interventions, and undermines Western efforts to impose expanded inspection mechanisms.
At the level of global power dynamics, the episode highlights the firmness of the Russian–Chinese axis and its growing ability to obstruct Western plans—reinforcing the movement toward a clearly defined multipolar order in the "Middle East" and particularly the Red Sea.
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